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Introduction
Herd behavior among investors is often viewed as a significant threat for the functioning of financial markets. The distorting effects of herding on financial markets range from informational inefficiency to increased stock price volatility, or even bubbles and crashes.
While the herding phenomenon has been explored extensively in the literature, theory and evidence on herding are typically only loosely connected. The theoretical herding literature has greatly contributed to the understanding under which conditions herding may occur on an individual investor level for single stocks in a tick-by-tick trading context. Herd models, however, have not been exploited to provide insights on how such individual herding relates to herding intensity of an investor group aggregated across a set of heterogeneous stocks and over time. Due to data limitations, on the other hand, empirical researchers typically cannot assess herding in an investor-specific and high-frequency trading context. Instead they have to rely on estimates of aggregate herding intensity. As a consequence, the interpretation of estimation results is intuitive but typically not closely related to a particular herd model. 1 This paper proposes to interpret empirical herding measures through the lens of a simulated herd model, thereby contributing towards closing the gap between theoretical and empirical herding literature. Specifically, we simulate the herd model of Park and Sabourian (2011) for a broad range of parameters to derive testable, theory-based hypotheses on aggregate 1 For example, several empirical studies investigating the size effect of herding are based on the plausible but unproven hypothesis that herding intensity should be the larger the smaller the quantity and quality of available information, see e.g. Lakonishok et al. (1992) , Wermers (1999) , and Sias (2004) . In the same vein, herding intensity is linked to the stage of the development of the financial market, see e.g. Walter and Weber (2006) . 1 herding intensity. In a second step, these hypotheses are tested using a unique highfrequency, investor-specific data set.
The theoretical herding literature defines herd behavior as the switch in an agent's opinion into the direction of the crowd, see e.g. Brunnermeier (2001) . As herders ignore their own private information, herd behavior is always informationally inefficient and thus has the potential to distort prices and to destabilize markets. The main focus of the theoretical herding literature is the investigation of the microeconomic drivers for such informationally inefficient behavior. In the seminal work of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) herding stems from information externatilities that an observable investment decision of one agent exhibits on subsequent agents' expectation regarding the investment value. Other microeconomic foundations of herd behavior include reputational concerns (see e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) , Graham (1999) and Dasgupta et al. (2011) ) as well as investigative herding (see Froot et al. (1992) and Hirshleifer et al. (1994) ). 2 The herding concept was put into a financial market context by Avery and Zemsky (1998) . Recently, their model was developed further to a more general setting by Park and Sabourian (2011) . In line with the earlier literature, Park and Sabourian (2011) concentrate on indentifying microeconomic drivers for individual investor herding. In particular, they show that similar to Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 2 Reputational herd models modify the agents' objective functions such that their decisions are affected by positive externalities from a good reputation. Investigative herd models examine conditions under which investors may choose to base their decisions on the same information resulting in correlated trading behavior. Investigative herding is outside the scope of this study as it cannot be detected with trading data but rather requires data on the investors' information acquisition process. For comprehensive surveys of the herding literature, see e.g. Chamley (2004) , Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003) and Vives (2008) . 2 information externalities induce herd behavior in their model. 3 It is this microeconomic focus of the theoretical herding literature that impedes an analytical approach to derive results for herding intensity aggregated across investors or time. This may explain why herd models have not been exploited to provide hypotheses on aggregate herding intensity that can be tested empirically.
Empirical researchers on the other hand typically do not have the means to assess herding on the same microlevel discussed in the theoretical literature. To be able to analyze investor herding and interpret it in the context of a particular herd model, high-frequency, investor-specific trading data would be needed. However, empirical studies typically have to rely on either investor-specific but low-frequency data as, e.g., in Lakonishok et al. (1992) , Sias (2004) , and Wermers (1999) , or on high-frequency but anonymous transaction data, compare Barber et al. (2009) or Zhou and Lai (2009). 4 Even with high-frequency, investor-specific trading data, empirical researchers would have to rely on proxies for aggregate informationally inefficient herding intensity as trading data by itself cannot fully reveal the drivers for a specific investor decision. This insight found its way into the work of Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004) , which have become trailblazers for the empirical herding literature. In Lakonishok et al. (1992) , herding of a group of investors is measured as a tendency to accumulate on one side of the market. Specifically, they test whether the share of net buyers in individual stocks significantly deviates from the average share of net buyers across all stocks. Sias (2004) proposes a more dynamic approach to test for herding. He investigates whether the accumulation of investors on one side of the market persists over time by measuring the cross-sectional correlation of the share of net buyers over two adjacent time periods. In contrast to the theoretical literature, both empirical herding measures examine herding intensity on an aggregate level with respect to investors, stocks and time. Hence, neither Lakonishok et al. (1992) nor Sias (2004) can tie their evidence or its interpretation to a particular herd model leaving the theoretical and empirical herding literature largely disconnected.
From a theoretical perspective, we contribute to close this gap in the literature by deriving predictions for aggregate herding intensity from numerical simulations of the Park and Sabourian (2011) model. Our analysis is based on the Park and Sabourian (2011) model because its sequential trading structure allows for a quantitative analysis of aggregate herding intensity in a financial market context. Moreover, herding in Park and Sabourian (2011) is generated under rather weak assumptions and for a very rich set of information structures. Therefore, it can be related to a wide range of microeconomic drivers such as information asymmetries, reputational concerns and transaction costs respectively.
The focus of this paper is on the impact of market stress and information risk on 4 aggregate herding intensity because both concepts can be easily translated into the model and are of significant economic relevance. While herd behavior certainly has the potential to create times of market stress, it is less clear whether the reverse relationship holds, thereby creating vicious cycles of economic downturns and high volatility regimes. 5 Information risk, defined as the probability of trading with a counterpart who holds private information about the asset (see Easley et al. (1996) ), reflects the degree of asymmetric information in herd models. Information risk is thus a key determinant for herd behavior.
By simulating the Park and Sabourian (2011) herd model for a broad range of parameters generating about 2.6 billion trades to analyze, we obtain two testable hypotheses regarding the impact of information risk and market stress on aggregate herding intensity: First, an increase in information risk should result in an increase of both, buy and sell herding intensity. And second, increased market stress should have an asymmetric effect on herding intensity: it should imply a decrease in buy herding intensity but an increase in sell herding intensity. To the best of our knowledge, these findings are the first theory-founded comparative static results for herding intensity in a stock market.
From an empirical perspective, we contribute to the literature by testing modelbased hypotheses using an intra-day, investor-specific data set provided by the German 5 While Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Christie and Huang (1995) confirm that herding increases during times of market stress, Kremer and Nautz (2013a,b) find that herding in the German stock market even slightly decreased during the recent financial crisis. Similar results are provided by Hwang and Salmon (2004) for herding intensity during the Asian and the Russian crisis in the nineties. particularly important as we need to directly identify transactions by each trader in order to determine whether an investor follows the observed actions of other traders or her own trades. 7 To assess herding empirically, we employ the herding measure proposed by Sias (2004) . 8 The dynamic nature of the Sias measure makes it particularly appropriate for the analysis of high-frequency data. It reflects the theoretical notion of herders' switching behavior more accurately than the static measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992) . Moreover, the Sias measure incorporates the intuition of the Park and Sabourian (2011) model that during periods of herding, high shares of e.g. net buy-6 This data set has already been used by two companion papers. Kremer and Nautz (2013b) demonstrate the importance of both data frequency and the possibility to identify traders for resulting herding measures. Kremer and Nautz (2013a) regress daily herding measures on e.g. size, volatility and other stock characteristics to analyze the causes of herding. The current paper builds on these studies in two important aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that analyzes intra-day herding intensity using investor-specific data. Second, similar to the bulk of the empirical literature, the empirical analyses of Kremer and Nautz (2013a,b) are not related to a particular herd model.
7 Recently, Cipriani and Guarino (2013) proposed a method to estimate a herd model with anonymous transaction data.
8 Note that like all empirical herding measures, the Sias measure is only an approximation of informationally inefficient herding defined in the theory. It is our view, however, that a comprehensive assessment of the accuracy of empirical herding measures with respect to theoretical herding should only be conducted after a methodological link between theory and evidence has been established and hence is beyond the scope of this study. 6 ers persist over time. The Sias measure also captures the second feature of our data: having access to investor-specific information, it allows differentiating between traders that indeed follow predecessors and traders that simply follow themselves, for example, because they split their trades. Interestingly, the Sias measure has not been applied to intra-day data before.
In accordance with our first theory-based hypothesis, our empirical results show that herding intensity increases with information risk. In particular, the analysis of half-hour trading intervals reveals a strong and significant co-movement of trading activity and the herding intensity of institutional traders. In contrast to our theorybased hypothesis on the effect of market stress on herding intensity, however, our results do not suggest an asymmetric impact of market stress on herding intensity. In fact, we find that both, sell as well as buy herding slightly increased in the German stock market during the financial crisis. Through the lens of the Park and Sabourian (2011) model, these results suggest that herding observed empirically during the financial crisis may only be unintentional or spurious.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we review the model of Park and Sabourian (2011) , which is the theoretical basis of our further analysis. We discuss how to define and measure herding intensity in the model and its simulation, and explain how information risk and the degree of market stress are reflected in the model. Section 3 introduces the simulation setup and derives the hypotheses on the role of information risk and market stress for herding intensity.
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Section 4 introduces the empirical herding measure. Section 5 presents the data and shows the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Information risk and market stress in a herd model 2.1 The herd model Park and Sabourian (2011) consider a sequential trading modelà la Glosten and Milgrom (1985) consisting of a single asset, informed and noise traders, and a market maker. The model assumes rational expectations and common knowledge of its structure. Park and Sabourian (2011) not only investigate herd behavior but also contrarian behavior in their model. We focus only on herd behavior, however, since herd behavior is self-enforcing while contrarian behavior is self-defeating. Therefore, the destabilizing effects of contrarianism are limited and, thus, only of secondary importance for financial markets.
The asset: There is a single risky asset with unknown fundamental value V ∈ {V 1 , V 2 , V 3 }, where V 1 < V 2 < V 3 . 9 Its distribution is given by 0 < P (V = V j ) < 1 for j = 1, 2, 3 where
The asset is traded over t = 1, . . . , T consecutive points in time. Thus, the trading period under consideration is [0, T ]. In Section 3, we will choose T = 100 for simulating the model. 9 Cipriani and Guarino (2008) make a first attempt to theoretically study contagion and information cascades in a two asset model. Their model is heavily based on Avery and Zemsky (1998) and can thus be seen as a variation of Park and Sabourian (2011) .
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The traders: Traders arrive one at a time in a random exogenous order in the market and decide to buy, to sell, or not to trade one unit of the asset at the quoted bid and ask prices. 10 Traders are either informed traders or noise traders. The fraction of informed traders is denoted by µ. 11 Informed traders base their decision to buy, sell or not to trade on their expectations regarding the asset's true value. In addition to the publicly available information consisting of the history of trades H t , i.e. all trades observed until period t, informed traders form their expectations according to a private signal S ∈ {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } on the fundamental value of the asset. They will buy (sell) one unit of the asset if their expected value of the asset conditioned on their information set is strictly greater (smaller) than the ask (bid) price. Otherwise, informed traders choose not to trade. In the empirical herding literature, institutional investors are seen as a typical example for informed traders. Noise traders trade randomly, i.e. they decide to buy, sell or not to trade with equal probability of 1/3.
The private signal:
The distribution of signals is conditioned on the true value of the asset, i.e. P (S = S i | V = V j ) = p ij with 0 ≤ p ij ≤ 1 and
• u-shaped iff p i1 > p i2 and p i2 < p i3 . Park and Sabourian (2011) show that a necessary condition for herding is that there exists a u-shaped signal. 12 In accordance with Park and Sabourian (2011) , we consider the case where one signal is u-shaped and both, optimists and pessimists are present in the market, i.e. one signal is monotone increasing (optimist) and another signal is monotone decreasing (pessimist). 13
The market maker: Trading takes place in interaction with a market maker who quotes a bid and ask price. The market maker has access only to public information and is subject to perfect competition such that he makes zero-expected profit. Thus, he sets the ask (sell) price equal to his expected value of the asset given a buy (sell) order and the public information. Formally, he sets ask t = E[V |H t ∪ {a t = buy}] and
, where a t is the action of a trader in time t. 14 2.2 Herding intensity Park and Sabourian (2011) Analogously, a trader with signal S sell herds in period t at history H t if and only if
The history of trades contains more sells than buys, i.e. the crowd sells)
This definition is less restrictive than the one used in Park and Sabourian (2011) .
Above, herding refers to switches from not buying (not selling) to buying (selling), whereas Park and Sabourian (2011) define herding to be extreme switches from selling to buying and vice versa. However, as Park and Sabourian (2011) already noted, allowing herd behavior to include switches from holding to selling or buying is a legitimate extension which they do not consider only to be consistent with some of the earlier theoretical work on herding. For our empirical application, including switches from holding to selling or buying is more appropriate because such switches also contribute to stock price movements. 15 Item (iii) of the above definition also slightly differs from the one in Park and Sabourian (2011) . There, (iii) reads E[V |H t ] > E[V ] for buy herding (and analogously for sell herding) and is based on the idea that prices rise (fall) when there are more (less) buys than sells. However, for an empirical analysis of herd behavior based on trading data, it is more convenient to base the definition of herding more closely to the term "following the crowd": While we can observe the number of buys and sells, the market's expectation of the asset's true value, E[V |H t ], can at best be approximated.
By definition, only informed traders can herd. Therefore, herding intensity is defined as the number of trades where traders engaged in herd behavior as a fraction of the total number of informed trades. In order to remain close to our empirical application we consider only trades from informed types and exclude holds, since we investigate institutional trading and our data does not cover holds. Specifically, for each trading 15 Note that it would also be possible to include switches from selling or buying to holding. However, we are mainly interested in herd behavior which potentially contributes to stock price volatility. Any switch to holding cannot amplify stock price movements or cause the stock price to move into the wrong direction. The only empirical effect would be a reduction in trading volume. By model assumption, however, liquidity is steadily provided by noise traders. Easley et al. (1996) introduce information risk as the probability that an observed trade was executed by an informed trader. Thus, information risk coincides with the parameter µ, the fraction of informed traders, in the model of Park and Sabourian (2011) . Therefore, we derive our theoretical prediction for the effect of information risk on herding intensity by conducting comparative static analysis for herding intensity with respect to changes in µ.
Information risk and market stress in the model
Times of market stress are typically understood as times of deteriorated economic outlook and increased risk, when markets become more pessimistic and more uncertain.
In the model of Park and Sabourian (2011) The prior distribution for an asset, P (V ), is taken from the set P = {P (V ) : P (V j ) ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.8} for j = 1, 2, 3 and
Thereby, we consider only situations where the risky asset V takes each value V 1 , V 2 , V 3 with positive probability. This parametrization produces |P| = 36 different asset distributions.
The conditional signal distribution, P (S|V ) is chosen from
where we consider only those signal structures C ⊂C which imply more optimists in "good times", i.e. p 13 < p 23 < p 33 , and more pessimists in "bad times", i.e. p 11 > p 21 > p 31 . As a result, the simulation accounts for |C| = 41 different signal structures. 16
16 Note that the concept of e.g. more pessimists in bad times is different from the earlier introduced concept of the signals of informed traders. While (p i1 , p i2 , p i3 ) constitute the i-th column of P (S|V ), the signal Sj is described by the j-th row of P (S|V ). That is, our parameterization contains monotone increasing, monotone decreasing, and u-shaped signals while in good times, i.e. when V3 realizes, there is a higher likelihood for an informed trader to receive an increasing signal than a decreasing signal, whereas in bad times, i.e. when V1 realizes, the opposite holds. The results of these model simulations are used to derive predictions on the effect of changes in information risk on average herding intensity as follows: In a first step, we fix µ ∈ M and calculate average herding intensity as the average across all parameterizations in {µ} × P × C. In a second step, we evaluate how average herding intensity varies with µ. Correspondingly, to analyze the effect of market stress on average herding intensity, we fix P (V ) ∈ P and calculate average herding intensity across all parameterizations in M × {P (V )} × C. Next, we evaluate how average herding intensity varies with the distribution of the asset, P (V ), where the degree of market stress implied by P (V ) is given by its coefficient of variation, V C(V ). The fraction of informed traders determines the probability for the market maker to encounter an informed trader and, thus, the information risk in the market. Therefore, the simulation results shown in Figure 1 can be summarized as follows:
Simulation results
Hypothesis 1 (Information Risk and Herding Intensity). Average sell and buy herding intensity increase in information risk. of the fundamental value. 17 The higher the variation coefficient, the more severe the market stress. In contrast to information risk, the impact of market stress on herding is highly asymmetrical. For sell herding intensity, the simulation results demonstrate a strong positive relationship of average herding intensity and the variation coefficient.
Therefore, the higher the degree of market stress, the higher the average sell herding intensity to be expected in a heterogenous stock market. For buy herding intensity, however, the higher the variation coefficient, the smaller the average herding intensity, although the relationship is clearly less pronounced. 18 We summarize our simulation results obtained for the relationship between our proxy for market stress and average herding intensity as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (Herding Intensity and Market Stress). Average buy herding intensity decreases with market stress, whereas sell herding intensity increases. 
Empirical herding measure
Simulating a herd model allows us to determine for each trade whether herding actually occurred. As a result, the exact herding intensity can be calculated for each model simulation. In an empirical application, it is much more difficult to decide whether a trader herds or not since researchers have no access to private signals.
The dynamic herding measure proposed by Sias (2004) is designed to explore whether (institutional) investors follow each others' trades by examining the correlation between the traders' buying tendency over time. The Sias herding measure is, therefore, particularly appropriate for high-frequency data. Similar to the static herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) , the starting point of the Sias measure is the number of buyers as a fraction of all traders. Specifically, consider a number of N it institutions trading in stock i at time t. Out of these N it institutions, a number of b it institutions are net buyers of stock i at time t. The buyer ratio br it is then defined
. According to Sias (2004) , the ratio is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance:
where σ(br it ) is the cross sectional standard deviation of buyer ratios across I stocks at time t. The Sias herding measure is based on the correlation between the standardized 20 buyer ratios in consecutive periods:
The cross-sectional regression is estimated for each time t and then the Sias measure for herding intensity is calculated as the time-series average of the estimated coefficients:
It is worth emphasizing that this kind of averaging is very much in line with the way we calculate average herding intensity in the model simulation.
The Sias methodology further differentiates between investors who follow the trades of others (i.e., true herding according to Sias (2004) ) and those who follow their own trades. For this purpose, the correlation is decomposed into two components:
where I is the number of stocks traded. D nit is a dummy variable that equals one if institution n is a buyer in i at time t and zero otherwise. D mi,t−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if trader m (who is different from trader n) is a buyer at time t − 1. Therefore, the first part of the measure represents the component of the crosssectional inter-temporal correlation that results from institutions following their own 21 strategies when buying or selling the same stocks over adjacent time intervals. The second part indicates the portion of correlation resulting from institutions following the trades of others over adjacent time intervals. According to Sias (2004) , a positive correlation that results from institutions following other institutions, i.e., the latter part of the decomposed correlation, can be regarded as evidence for herd behavior. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we shall therefore focus on the latter term of equation (3) which we denote by Sias. According to Choi and Sias (2009) , Equation (3) can be further decomposed to distinguish between the correlations associated with "buy herding" (br i,t−1 > 0.5) and "sell herding" (br i,t−1 < 0.5).
5 Information risk, market stress and herding intensity:
Empirical results
Data
The data are provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
Under Section 9 of the German Securities Trading Act, all credit institutions and financial services institutions are required to report to BaFin any transaction in securities or derivatives which are admitted to trading on an organized market. These records make it possible to identify all relevant trade characteristics, including the trader (the institution), the particular stock, time, number of traded shares, price, and the volume of the transaction. Moreover, the records specify on whose behalf the trade was executed, i.e., whether the institution traded for its own account or on behalf of a client that is not a financial institution. Since this study is concerned with institutional trades, particularly those of financial institutions, we focus on the trading of own accounts, i.e., those cases when a bank or a financial services institution is clearly the originator of the trade. We exclude institutions trading exclusively for the purpose of market making.
We also exclude institutions that are formally mandated as designated sponsors, i.e., liquidity providers, for a specific stock. 
Information risk and herding intensity
The more informed traders are active in a market, the higher the probability of informed trading and, thus, information risk. According to Hypothesis 1, average herding intensity increases with information risk reflected in the parameter µ, the fraction of informed traders. In the following, we use two empirical proxies for the level of information risk: i) the number of active institutional traders and ii) the share of the institutional trading volume.
According to e.g. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Tannous et al. (2013) , the fraction of informed traders and, thus, information risk cannot be expected to be constant over a trading day. In order to account for intra-day trading patterns in the German stock market, we divide each trading day into 17 half-hour intervals. A trading day is defined as the opening hours of the trading platform Xetra (9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.), on which the bulk of trades occur. The use of half-hour intervals ensures that the number of active institutions is sufficiently high for calculating intra-day herding measures. 20 The first two columns of Table 1 show how both empirical proxies for information risk are distributed within a day. Apparently, institutional traders are more active at the opening and closing intervals, irrespective of the measure of trading activity.
In order to investigate the intra-day pattern of herding intensity, we calculate the Sias herding measure for each half-hour time interval separately. The results of this exercise are also shown in Table 1 . The third column shows for each interval the overall Sias measure (Sias) which is based on the average correlation of buy ratios between two intervals, see Equation (2) in Section 4. Following Sias (2004) , this correlation may overstate the true herding intensity because it does not account for correlation which results from traders who follow themselves. It is a distinguishing feature of our investor-specific data that it allows to address that problem even on an intra-day basis.
In particular, column four reports the correlation due to investors following the trades of others (Sias) , see Equation (3). and Nautz (2013a,b) . Third, the sizable differences between Sias and Sias highlights the importance of using investor-specific data.
How is the observed intra-day variation of information risk related to the intra-day herding intensity of institutional investors? The Sias herding measure depends on the trading behavior of two subsequent time periods. Therefore, for each time interval herding intensity is compared with the average information risk of the corresponding time intervals. 21 Figure 3 reveals a strong intra-day co-movement between both proxies 21 Note that this is line with the intuition from the herd model of Park and Sabourian (2011) . On the one hand, high information risk in t − 1 leads institutional investors to believe that there is a high degree of information contained in previously observed trades. On the other hand, high information risk in t ensures that there is a high number of potential herders active in the market. Both effects contribute positively to herding intensity in period t. 
Herding in times of market stress
According to Hypothesis 2, sell herding should increase in times of market stress when uncertainty increases and markets become more pessimistic about the value of the asset. In contrast, buy herding intensity should decline in a crisis. In our application, a natural candidate to test this hypothesis is the outbreak of the financial crisis. In order to investigate the effect of the crisis on herding intensity, we calculate sell and buy herding measures for the crisis and the pre-crisis period separately. The pre-crisis period ends on August 9, 2007 as this is widely considered as the starting date of the financial crisis in Europe, see e.g. European Central Bank (2007) and Abbassi and Linzert (2012) .
Herding measures obtained before and during the crisis are displayed in Table 2 .
The results are hardly compatible with the predictions of the simulated model. At first sight, the statistically significant yet small increase in sell herding (5.74 > 5.41) is in line with theoretical expectations. However, buy herding intensity has definitely not decreased in the crisis period. In fact, buy herding has even increased (5.09 > 4.10). How can this contradicting evidence be explained? Probably, the effects claimed by Hypothesis 2 hold but are overshadowed by counteracting factors. For example, Kremer and Nautz (2013b) show that the market share of institutional investors has dropped sharply since the outbreak of the financial crisis. If this drop in trading activity of financial institutions can be interpreted as a decline in information risk, then a crisisdriven increase in sell herding could be ameliorated by a decrease of sell herding due to lower information risk. However, in this case, a potential drop in information risk makes the observed increase in buy herding even more puzzling. Another explanation could be that the deterioration in the economic outlook induced by the financial crisis was relatively small compared to the increase in uncertainty. In this case, our simulation exercise shows that both buy and sell herding intensity should increase where sell herding should increase slightly stronger. 23 Still, the evidence shows that buy herding increased slightly more contradicting the simulation-based prediction. Ederington and Goh (1998) and Jorion et al. (2005) argue that firms have an incentive to withhold bad news from investors, but release good news voluntarily. Such incentives may increase during times of market stress, as positive news help to separate the firm from its poorly performing peers and, thereby, to shield it from negative spillover effects. In the framework of Park and Sabourian (2011) , a large share of informed traders might translate those positive news into the same monotone increasing signal advising them to buy. Since the resulting increase in buys stems from investors' correlated signals rather than from investors inferring information of the trades of oth-23 Results are not shown here, but are available upon request. ers, the model predicts higher buy ratios but not increased buy herding. As a result, the observed increase in the buy herding measure during the financial crisis may be only spurious and unrelated to the herding behavior considered in the theoretical herding literature.
Concluding remarks
Due to data limitations and the absence of testable, model-based predictions, the theoretical and the empirical herding literature are only loosely connected. This paper proposes an approach that contributes towards closing this gap. To obtain theoryfounded results, we conduct numerical simulations of the financial market herd model of Park and Sabourian (2011) . These theory-based hypotheses are tested empirically applying the herding measure of Sias (2004) to investor-specific and high-frequency trading data from the German stock market DAX. In particular, we derive and test hypotheses on how information risk and market stress affect herding intensity.
In accordance with our simulation results, we find that aggregate herding intensity increases with information risk. The empirical evidence regarding the impact of market stress on herding intensity, however, is only mixed. In particular, the estimated increase in buy herding during the recent financial crisis is not consistent with the simulationbased model prediction.
The results provided in this paper demonstrate that more research is needed to further close the gap between theory and evidence. For example, during crises periods correlation across assets and contagious effects may play a particular role in explaining investors' behavior. Herd models, however, are typically single asset models and are not designed to provide insights about herd behavior in a context of correlated assets and informational spillovers. To improve the interpretation of evidence based on aggregate herding measures, an extension of herd models to a multiple asset setting would be an interesting avenue for future research. Empirical herding measures, on the other hand, assess correlated trade behavior (see, e.g., Lakonishok et al. (1992) , Sias (2004 ), Chang et al. (2000 or Patterson and Sharma (2010) ) and are, thus, very good in detecting situations where investors accumulate on one side of the market. They can hardly reveal, however, to what extent this correlation is actually due to traders neglecting their private information and following the actions of others. Therefore, empirical herding measures cannot distinguish between true (or informationally inefficient) and spurious (or unintentional) herd behavior. In the case of spurious herding, correlated trading is not necessarily a sign of inefficiency but could be due to a common reaction to fundamentals or similar risk models, see Kremer and Nautz (2013a) .
The current paper showed that the pattern of trading correlation and information risk can be related to true herding, which raises worries about market efficiency in times of high information risk. By contrast, our results suggest that the increase in the correlation of buys estimated for the crisis period is more convincingly explained by unintentional herding.
